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STEVEN SCHARG, ESQ. On behalf of Keithon Porter To Obtain Certified Transcript, Contact: Ronald A. DiBartolomeo, Official Court Reporter Theodore Levin United States Courthouse 231 West Lafayette Boulevard, Room 1067 Detroit, Michigan 48226 (313) 962-1234 Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography. Transcript produced by computer-aided transcription. 

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Detroit, Michigan 1 2 Thursday, June 14, 2018 3 4 THE CLERK: Case Number 15-20652, United 5 6 States versus Billy Arnold, et al. 7 THE COURT: Good morning. 8 MR. DALY: Good morning, Judge. THE COURT: Okay. We have several matters to 9 10 address today. Sorry for the cramp quarters. 11 The first I think will be Mr. Fisher's motion to 12 sever. Mr. Scharg? 13 MR. H. SCHARG: Yes, your Honor. Your Honor, 14 Henry Scharg on behalf of Mr. Eugene Fisher. 15 We did file a motion to sever. The government has filed a response, and we filed a reply brief yesterday 16 17 morning. I assume the Court --18 THE COURT: I've seen it. 19 MR. H. SCHARG: -- seen everything. In terms of -- basically it's two arguments. The government says 20 21 this is an untimely motion. A motion to sever is never 22 untimely. It evolves around the circumstances of the 23 trial, the dynamics of the trial. To say that we were 24 untimely, and that it should have been filed earlier, I 25 also pulled out the motion filed by Mr. Swor on behalf of

Mr. Robinson. That was filed May 14th. It was not opposed by the government. They never raised the timeliness issue. For them to come in and say that it wasn't filed on March 1st is very much a hollow issue because you have to be consistent in raising opposition, and in fact, when it comes to severance motions -- I mean, if you file early, the Court will say, let's wait and see what happens and how this plays out.

You can file it way before trial. You can file it right before trial. You can file it during trial. It depends on the circumstances of the case, and I did raise that motion periodically during this case. Every time -- even before Mr. Swor started raising it when we were getting the groups together, we raised the issue that we did not want to be with this group, the death eligible individuals. When Mr. Swor raised the issue, we did so again, and even as late as several weeks ago, the day that Mr. Graveline gave notice and we had conference in chambers, I brought it up again at that point in time, and it's something that I have consistently raised as an issue.

The only problem is that it has become more prevalent as an issue here at this point in time. After the jury selection process where I saw that the government has strategically attempted to use Mr. Fisher -- use to

try to connect him to the other co-defendants in this case, constantly using the words "they" and "defense" when clearly that is in violation of the instructions that the Court is going to give the jury; that each -- that each defendant should be judged separately, that guilt or innocence is personal and individual, and the instruction reads on, it is your duty to separately consider the evidence against each defendant on each charge and return separate verdicts.

Based upon what happened from both sides of the table, both from the government and the defense, people were trying to treat my client as part of the defense, as part of the group at the table, and not to judge him separately. It became more obvious during the last several days of jury selection that my client would not be able to get a fair trial.

Ironically, he is Number 3 or the top individual on this indictment when, in fact, he is the least culpable. The only reason he's Number 3 is because originally way back when, the original charges were just for felon in possession, and for that reason he was charged with Mr. Arnold and Mr. Arthur in terms of the traffic stop of Mr. Arnold and Mr. Arthur back in September of 2015. He was high on that list, but, in fact, he is the least culpable and not involved in any

murders, robberies, attempted murders, et cetera, et cetera, and it's clear that is he is being grouped in here by the government because the government has suggested to the Court the groupings, it's strictly for spillover effect.

If, in fact, that you were going to sever him and he would have to have a separate trial from everyone else, you know, have a separate trial himself, I think there would be at least a more valid argument by the government. The fact is there is a number of other defendants that are more in line with the drug offenses, the nonviolent offenses, with the weapon offenses that Mr. Fisher is charged with, and it would be more in line and consistent with the charges -- in the offenses to group Mr. Fisher in with a later -- with a later group of defendants, and we know that there will be at least one or two other trials that will follow and are subsequent to this one.

Finally -- finally, there has been a lot of -- as I said in my reply brief, there has been a lot of -- we are concerned about the vocal and disruptive nature of several of the co-defendants in this case. That concerned us at the pretrial stage as Mr. Fisher and I sat at the table while other co-defendants were in the box. Some of the co-defendants were vocal and were disruptive, and we were concerned at that time, but we also thought that the

situation had been resolved. It has not. Even as late as last week, we saw certain types of behavior from the defendants -- defendants, each defendant, from that table that continued to concern us; that the -- not only had there been vocal and disruption during the pretrial, but the disruption and disrespect for the Court was not only diminishing, but getting greater, and it's more of a concern to Mr. Fisher's right to a fair trial.

For all -- and one other thing. I just want to make clear, there's three substantive counts regarding the May 10th non-fatal shooting on State Fair and Hoover.

Those are Counts 24, 25 and 26 I believe, and the argument is -- 25, 26 and 27, and the argument is somewhat being made that well, it's just not the text messages and the postings which are really the overt acts in the RICO conspiracy that Mr. Fisher is being charged with, but we have these substantive acts, vicar acts of attempted murder, assault with a firearm in furtherance and use of a firearm. It sounds real serious.

The evidence regarding those three counts are that Mr. Arnold was in the area of the Lamont house, in that sector, which is, you know, a several mile sector; that he was in that area after the -- after the State Fair shooting. There's nothing else to tie -- there's nothing to tie Mr. Arnold into -- into Mr. Fisher's house.

There's nothing to tie Mr. Fisher into this. The only evidence regarding these three vicar counts is that at some point in time after the shooting, Mr. Arnold's phone bounced off a cell tower closest to the Lamont address, which they say was the stash house. That's the only evidence. It is the thinnest of thin evidence, and quite frankly, I'm pretty confident that won't survive a Rule 29 motion at the end of the case, but it will linger on throughout the case.

And in fact, you may ask why, why was Mr. Fisher charged with those offenses, if, in fact, the only evidence was that the cell phone bounced off that cell tower that day. And the reason is because Agent Ruiz testified before a grand jury that on May 10th, the phone call was made from Eugene Fisher's house on Lamont, which as you recall from the government's expert on cell tower analysis cannot be determined.

It is our position that the only reason Mr. Fisher is charged with those counts is because Agent Ruiz who, as far as from my review, whose reputation, credibility and truthfulness maybe legendary, gave false testimony before a grand jury; that the -- that the -- that Billy Arnold made these phone calls from Mr. Fisher's house on Lamont after the shooting, which we know based upon the prior testimony, it's impossible to say that.

The only thing the cell tower expert could say was that when a phone -- a cell phone hits a tower, you don't know who's making the call, and you don't know the direct area -- you don't know where the call is being made from, but it's in the vicinity of the sector or the slice so it would probably was in that area, but nothing more.

For all of the reasons, we are asking this Court to sever Mr. Fisher from this trial group for the reason that there is a problem regarding fundamental fairness and his ability to get a fair trial being grouped with the present defendants and the offenses for which they are charged.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Scharg.

Mr. Bilkovic?

MR. BILKOVIC: Thank you, your Honor.

The first thing that I want to deal with is the comments that Mr. Scharg talked about, and the statement that he put in his reply brief where he indicates that it was not anticipated that this disrespectful banter, disruptive behavior and disrespect and lack of courtroom etiquette would continue as the trial began, but it appears there is not an end in sight.

Frankly, I don't know what he is talking about. I sat through three days of jury selection. I didn't see

it. None of the other government attorneys saw it. The Court at no time stopped proceedings because the Court was concerned about anything occurring.

So frankly, I don't know what he's talking about, but I certainly think if there is anything like that, the Court will make sure it polices that to make sure that behavior does not occur.

Moving onto his motion to sever where he is telling you that his client is the least culpable in this case, that's absolutely not true, notwithstanding the fact that a defendant is not entitled to severance because the proof is greater against a co-defendant. His client is charged with one of the attempted murders in aid of racketeering, and he tells you about a couple of facts, but he doesn't tell you about all the facts.

You look at Devon Patterson. He's charged with Counts 1 and 32, and that's it. Look at Mr. Fisher. He's charged with Counts 1 and 32. He's charged with Counts 25, 26, 27, 33.

The day of the Mother's Day shooting, there was a call between Billy Arnold and Eugene Fisher prior to the shooting.

There's a video of Eugene Fisher that will be presented at trial where he's holding an assault rifle talking about going out on ops, going out on operations.

There is a conversation between Billy Arnold and Eugene Fisher via text message in the late evening of September 25, 2015 where Billy Arnold tells him that I need to come to your crib and grab my hookups. I'm coming to your crib to grab something. Be close.

Shortly thereafter, Billy Arnold gets into a high speed police chase, and the police recover the Bushmaster rifle that was used in multiple shootings.

Shortly after that, a couple of days later, Eugene Fisher posts a picture on Facebook with him and another gentleman, where one of them is holding an assault rifle, and Mr. Fisher just says -- or says, the feds just took my AR that my bro is holding.

This is a defendant that is charged with RICO violation in Count 32 along with all of the other defendants -- I'm sorry -- Count 1 with all of the other defendants, which means the evidence against him is going to be primarily the same as all of the other defendants.

There's absolutely no reason to sever him out of this case. He is not even close to being the least culpable. The evidence is basically in proving the RICO charge the same against him as it is against everybody else. Anything that he talks about with respect to the defendants, there's no prohibition when you have six defendants that are charged with one count of a RICO

violation to refer to them as the defendants.

I understand the jury will have to decide each one of the cases separately, and I think the jury is capable of doing that, but to tell the jury the defendants are charged with a RICO violation is a true statement. We weren't the only ones that did it. Defense counsel did it during their voir dire. There was no intentional design to bring specific attention to Mr. Fisher, and in fact, when Mr. Scharg was arguing this motion to you just now, he used the term "defendants" three different times.

So it's not being done by design to try to bring him into something that he is not part of. The Court has the ability through jury instructions throughout case, beginning of the case, middle of the case, and at the end of the case to make sure this jury knows, which I think this jury already knows after three days of jury selection, that they are to decide each defendant's case separately. I believe they are capable of doing that.

Based on the brief that the government submitted, there's absolutely no reason whatsoever to sever Mr. Fisher out of this case.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. H. SCHARG: Judge, may I briefly?

THE COURT: Yes, a minute.

MR. H. SCHARG: I want to school the

government a little on the history of this case very briefly.

We had a pretrial several months ago down in Judge Tarnow's courtroom where a number of the defendants were very disrespectful to the Court with banter, and just acting out, where the defense lawyers were all -- where -- where the marshals caucused with the defense lawyers -- all of the defense lawyers to reprimand them about the behavior of their clients. I thought at that time that -- I got the message, and I was hopeful that everyone -- and my client got the message, and we were hopeful that everybody got that message or memo.

It was apparent during this trial the other day -- and Mr. Bilkovic was in the courtroom -- when one of the defendants had an outburst and referred to the Court as Steeh. Steeh. I'm not getting my meals on time. Steeh.

That's the disrespect and banter that I'm talking about which is consistent with what happened at the earlier proceeding, and -- and I've been in this case from the duration, and -- and what I'm saying about the concerns that I have regarding a continuation of this type of conduct which has nothing but negatively affected my client's right to have a fair trial. There's nothing that I saw before. There's nothing that I saw in the last couple of days that changed my mind or make me feel that

this banter and disrespect will not continue in this trial.

My client wants no part of it. I don't want any part of it. The concern is that it will spill over to my client. Any type of disrespect or banter created will have a spill over affect to my client, his right to have a fair trial.

The government, you know, again talked about the May 10th shooting and says well, there was a phone call, and when we say "there was a phone call", that means from the detailed call records it shows that there was a call made from Mr. Arnold to Mr. Fisher. It doesn't tell us the length of the call, whether the call was completed, because when you make a call and someone doesn't pick it, it is still recorded in that -- in those records as a call.

So there's no evidence that there was ever any -there's some evidence there was a call made, but there's
nothing that there ever was a conversation or that the
call was completed that we have.

The other testimony was text messages from Mr. Arthur regarding a hookup. There's no indication that Billy Arnold went to Mr. Fisher's home at night and picked up a gun. All there is is a text saying I need my hookup.

Pics in September or later in 2015, months after

the shooting has nothing to do with the shooting itself.

This is all red herrings by the government.

When I say my client is the least culpable, he may not be the least culpable of the 21 defendants charged, but he's the least culpable of the people in this trial group, and it's for those reasons that we're asking the Court for the relief and severance.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Scharg.

The Court basically agrees with the position advocated by the government in this case, and I think it is important to clarify the timing question of this request for severance.

In the defendant's papers there was a reference to an oral motion that was made, and I think it was Mr. Scharg's recollection that the oral request for severance was made in either March or May, but indeed, the dates suggested were not accurate. The oral request by Mr. Scharg for severance was April 30, 2018, and at earlier hearings, both in March of 2015 and in May, May 22nd, the -- Mr. Scharg on behalf of his client was opposing the idea of severance.

Indeed, May 22nd, I believe we had an in chambers conference, and at that in chambers conference, Mr. Swor on behalf of Mr. Robinson pressed the written motion for

severance that he had filed, and the Court in chambers asked if any others were interested in severance because of the number of defendants that we had. The Court felt efficiency would dictate either the number that we have now or one less, and Mr. Swor, of course, did press his motion when we went back on the record, and Mr. Scharg did not, and I recall -- and I could be mistaken -- but I recall asking Mr. Scharg specifically that day in May whether his client was interested in severance, and I was told no, but all of that is kind of secondary any way to the arguments made here.

As it relates to misconduct on the part of the defendants, I think this was earlier in the case where there have been some episodes as described by Mr. Scharg that are less than desirable. We have no jurors at that point, and it's the Court's opinion that the behavior of the defendants during jury selection was fine. They know who the decision maker is apparently, and I don't -- I didn't consider their behavior disruptive in the least.

The one issue that we had with Mr. Patterson, the Court ended up concluding was not founded. The complaint that Mr. Patterson was making gestures was found to be not accurate, and I think it's logical to expect that the behavior by defendants during the trial is going to be as experienced with the jury selection process, and it was

fine.

So I think that concern on Mr. Fisher's part that the other co-defendants are going to misbehave and that would somehow prejudice his case is not a concern at all.

We have gone through jury selection. We have not sworn the jurors in. So I'm not concerned about jeopardy as it relates to Mr. Fisher, but Mr. Fisher participated in the jury selection process, and what am I to do if I were to grant this request? Am I going to have to consider starting all over again with jury selection? I don't think so, and yet, to the extent that he participated in that process, I think it is a legitimate question.

We have -- I was concerned about the room when I invited at this May 22nd date -- when I invited people to indicate if they wish the Court to consider severance, I was concerned about having a courtroom, period, much less a courtroom that would accommodate the number of co-defendants that we had as of that date, and I ended up getting one, and that was Mr. Swor who pressed his case, and at a minimum there was no request for severance as of that date by Mr. Scharg on behalf of Mr. Fisher.

So I think as it relates to his level of culpability, I don't know. In general, he's charged with furnishing weapons that were used in the commission of

murders and other serious violence, and I don't think that the seriousness or the culpability of the charges, if accurate, are of utmost seriousness and consequence.

So -- so I think for all of those reasons -- well in addition, we got -- this is my second trial under this indictment, and I've got -- I've got a number of defendants who are lined up for the next round, and I've got Mr. Arnold who will be tried separately, and a round to follow that presumably.

So it would be inefficient to add Mr. Fisher now to the next group up, which I think we already got seven defendants in that group. I'm not totally sure. It seems to me efficiency and fairness both dictate that the request be denied. So the Court will deny it.

MR. H. SCHARG: Very good, your Honor. I understand the Court's ruling. Therefore, I am asking the Court in its preliminary instructions to the jury on Monday to give 2.01(c), which is the instruction regarding separate consideration, which is the appropriate instruction that the Court will give at the end of the trial, but because of the concerns that I have, I'm requesting that instruction also be given --

**THE COURT:** I agree.

MR. H. SCHARG: Okay. And second of all, if either side, the government or co-counsel, make any

statements in front of the jury that's inconsistent with that, I will be standing up and objecting and asking for a cautionary instruction each time that happens.

THE COURT: Well, I'll think about that one.

MR. H. SCHARG: Okay.

THE COURT: All right. The next issue is the government's motion to exclude evidence or testimony concerning prior acquittals, and who will address that,

Mr. Bilkovic?

MR. BILKOVIC: Thank you, your Honor. I will be brief I know the Court read the pleadings.

The government is asking for a ruling from the Court prohibiting any mention or reference to Corey Bailey's acquittal of one of the murder cases that we're going to present evidence on this case, the October 21, 2009 Calloway murder, as well as recent Michael Rogers acquittal in the last trial.

I've cited to the Court the cases that are relevant on this issue, and basically those cases stand for the proposition that judgments of acquittal are almost always excluded because of the lack of relevancy because they are not proof of innocence, and the judgment of acquittal does not decide any facts of issue, but simply means the government failed to convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

Judgments of acquittal have little, if any, probative value, and if the Court were to determine there was some probative value, case law is very clear that if the Court makes that determination under a 403 analysis, the danger of unfair prejudice or confusing the jury substantially outweighs any limited probative value those may have, especially with respect to the Corey Bailey acquittal where you have a different sovereign, different evidence. It's not like we're going to just simply present the transcripts of that trial where it's going to be identical. There are going to be differences.

With respect to the Michael Rogers acquittal, he was charged with different charges and had a different role allegedly than defendants in this case. Those defendants in this case are charged with involvement in shootings, including murders, and so the difference between these defendants and Mr. Rogers are substantial, and based on those reasons, and the reasons that I've cited in the government's motion, we would ask the Court to preclude any mention or reference to those acquittals.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Bilkovic.

On behalf of the defendants, Mr. Daly?

MR. DALY: Yes. Thank you, Judge.

Judge, Craig Daly on behalf of Corey Bailey. Good morning.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. DALY: When I think about the government's motion I think it is closely tied to the question of the government's intent to introduce judgment of conviction, the proofs of some of the overt acts.

We filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that Mr. Bailey was acquitted of the Calloway murder. Your ruling was they were separate sovereigns, and that the government would be allowed to introduce evidence regarding the Calloway homicide. We're not opposed to the government introducing evidence based on your ruling. They are allowed to do that, and we will contest that evidence obviously, vigorously. So there's a difference between the question of evidence that the government seeks to introduce, and then the actual acquittal. So as I said, I think these are closely tied prior convictions and the acquittal.

When I filed a motion in limine on my behalf seeking to exclude the judgments of conviction, not the evidence, but the actual judgments as evidence, what the government responded to was with a single case, and that's the Tocco case, T-o-c-c-o. The Tocco case is a mafia case that was tried here in the Eastern District, and when you read that case, what the Court said was that the prior convictions were convictions and judgments of convictions

of the co-defendants, not of Mr. Tocco, and what they said was Mr. Tocco had the opportunity to show to the jury that he, Mr. Tocco, was not involved with the crimes for which the judgments of convictions for the co-defendants had been entered, and they talked about the right of the defendant to a trial by jury.

So what I'm saying is that these two issues before you are closely related, and I think that you have to consider them together; in other words, is the government going to be allowed to prove an overt act only to a judgment of conviction, or should they be allowed to introduce evidence?

On the second matter, we cannot oppose it. You've ruled that they can introduce evidence. That's fine. Let them do that, but the judgment of conviction in itself is misleading. It's confusing to the jury. They maybe of the impression that since Mr. Bailey was convicted of the underlying offense and there was the judgment of conviction, that they don't have any say in the matter.

The flip side of it is the same thing. The government is trying to preclude a judgment of conviction -- of acquittal saying that Mr. Bailey went to trial in state court, and he was acquitted, and they are also trying to preclude evidence of the acquittal itself because we expect that there maybe witnesses who will come

and say oh, I testified in that trial -- prior case in state court, and it may come up that he was acquitted.

So I think these are closely linked together, and our position is evidence that -- of the underlying cases that the government wants to introduce is admissible, but the actual judgments are not, and if you consider them together, the prior convictions and the acquittals, I think that the fair result would be both should be excluded. Let the government introduce the evidence that they want. Let us contest the underlying evidence regarding all of the overt acts, and leave the question of judgments and acquittals in the state court out of this case because it is very misleading. It's very confusing to the jury.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Daly.

MR. BILKOVIC: Your Honor, in brief response,

again, the problem is the law says that's what you do. It

talks about the limited relevance, if any, of acquittals,

but it talks about improving, especially the Tocco case,

improving -- or has evidence proving an act that you can

use, a prior conviction.

And the government's position at this point is we're not intending to use judgments of conviction, but if issues become contested, for example, we have a conviction where a defendant, such as Mr. Bailey, entered a guilty

plea where they laid out the factual basis of a conviction and there was a conviction entered, but yet, the defense at trial was he wasn't there. He was in another state. He had nothing to do with this. We certainly feel that we have the right to then bring that in.

But as a starting point, we don't plan at this point in our case in chief to use evidence of judgment of convictions to establish the predicate acts unless we're forced to based on a defense strategy. If based on the questioning, if we feel it is appropriate, we can approach the Court, have the Court make the determination, but right now we don't plan on using it, but I think under the Tocco case, if we want to establish it, we are entitled to.

THE COURT: All right. Okay. Thank you.

Based on the argument, both in the papers that have been filed with the Court, as well as orally today, I can certainly understand the argument by Mr. Daly that it doesn't appear to be fair if -- as it is one sided, and the issues are generally at least related to one another, but indeed, the relevance of an acquittal is quite different than the probative value of a conviction, and in light of the government's stated intention not to prove the fact of a conviction unless defense strategy would open that door, the Court has found the general discussion

of this issue and the ruling in U.S. versus Castro

Ramirez, 461 Fed Appendix 467, 2012 decision written by

Judge Sutton. The Court finds the reasoning persuasive.

There are references to Sixth Circuit opinions going back to as far as 1983 and 2002 that -- that would dictate granting the motion in limine filed by the government.

And so the Court grant that motion in limine.

There is to be no references to the acquittals subject that is the subject to that motion.

All right. So the next matter to address is a motion in limine filed by Mr. Daly.

MR. DALY: Thank you, Judge.

What I want to begin with -- because we have addressed a number of different areas -- I think it is helpful to start with what the parties agree to.

There was an agreement regarding a specific rap video that we filed a motion in limine, and the rap video is referred to as OG HardWorkJig Sonny, and it may be Sonny Cocaine, and that is Government Proposed Exhibit 68.

What we raised was a Fifth Amendment argument because as part of his rap, Mr. Bailey says, quote, I kept silent. It was well worth it.

There is some other language that he used in that context too about the prior homicide that you just ruled

on, where he says I beat the murder. Not guilty was the damn verdict. You just ruled that can be excised, that that should not be a part of the case.

I just want to say at this point, the agreement, as I understand the government's position, is that the reference to, I kept silent. It was well worth it, will not be admitted, and that's the extent of the agreement.

So we have an agreement between the parties with regard to that, and then we have the Court's ruling that this other portion should excised, and I think that's an accurate representation of that particular issue that I raised. Is that a fair summary?

MS. FINOCCHIARO: Yes, your Honor.

MR. DALY: Okay. So there are a number of issues that I need to go through. This will take me some time, so I appreciate your patience.

What I want to start with is the government's attempt to use certain aliases that Mr. Bailey used down in West Virginia. There were three separate incidents all in Charleston, West Virginia, and they are contained in Overt Acts 66, 72 and 74, and on three separate dates, and dates respectfully are October 27, 2009, November 6, 2009 and February 8, 2012.

So the government intends to use this information. They claim that this use of what they refer to as fake

names is part of the enterprise and conspiracy charge in Count 1.

What the government and the defense agrees to is what Sixth Circuit precedent is. What the law here in this circuit is that evidence of an alias is not to be used in an indictment or as evidence at trial. So it is disfavored, and that's the starting point, and the case law says there's one exception, and the one exception is is there a question of identification, and the question of identification could be raised in two contexts essentially.

One is the defense could say well, when Mr. Bailey was down in West Virginia and said that he was Eric Brown or Dwayne Pruitt, the defense could say hey, it wasn't Corey Bailey. It was some other person. That won't happen. We won't do that, and there's a good reason for it, and the reason for it is the second part, which is that law enforcement in each one of these instances was able to determine either at the time or shortly thereafter that the person was, in fact, Corey Bailey. No question about.

So when they either detained him or they arrested him, they would often take his photograph. They would take his fingerprints, and they knew who he was. So there's really no issue at all about whether or not there

was Corey Bailey. It's not a material issue.

So the government in response to the motion cited to the Weaver case, and the Weaver case is a Sixth Circuit unpublished opinion, and in the Weaver case they said that the use of an alias could be admitted because it was connected specifically to that case.

And what happened in Weaver is that Mr. Weaver was stopped by the police, and he gave what the police believed was a false name, and in response to that, they moved him from one place to another, to another residence so that they could determine who he was, and in the process of doing that, according to the police, Mr. Weaver took out a gun and dropped it.

So in the context of that case, they needed to show why it was that they were moving him from Point A to Point B and in relation to that he dropped the gun.

So that's the Weaver case, and that's so much different than what we're dealing with here, because the use of his aliases in all three instances are disconnected from anything that the police actually ended up doing. It doesn't matter. Had he said he was Mother Teresa or John F. Kennedy, everything that the police did for the most part afterwards ended up in with the same result.

So if we go first of all to the February 8, 2012 incident, which Overt Act 66, if you recall when we had

the evidentiary hearing, that's when Detective Allen had information about some drug activity at an apartment. That apartment belonged to a person named Adam Halstead. And so they went and did what they call is a knock and talk because they were doing an investigation, and when they walked into the apartment, they saw Mr. Halstead, they saw a man identified as Mr. Powell, and they saw Corey Bailey. And they asked Mr. Bailey what is your name, and he said Eric Brown, but because of those officers who were there had been doing an ongoing investigation, one of them knew already that he was not telling the truth about who he was, but that didn't make any difference, because really what they were looking for were drugs in the apartment.

So they searched the apartment, and they find a single pill in the bathroom, and according to Detective Allen, he comes back and confronts Mr. Bailey and he says, do you mind if I pat you down, and Mr. Bailey allegedly says okay, and they pat him down, and they find some money, and they put it back in his pocket, and then they say, can we pat you down further, and in that pat down, according to Detective Allen, he feels a hard object in the cheeks of his buttocks, and they place him under arrest because he believes, based on his experience, that there are drugs, and they take his down to the precinct.

They don't have the drugs, and they get a search warrant. And in the search warrant, they don't refer to Eric Brown because they know who he is. The search warrant to do that intrusive search is for Mr. Bailey because they know who he is. And so eventually Mr. Bailey turn over the drugs, and that's essentially it.

It doesn't matter whether he said my name is Corey Bailey or Eric Brown. What happened happened, and they ended up with the drugs. So it isn't intricately intertwine into what happened in this case. It didn't matter one way or the other.

The same thing if we go to November 6, 2009, which is Overt Act 72. That's the case where the government claims that Mr. Bailey was walking in a parking lot. As he's walking in the parking lot, nearby are officers from the Charleston West, Virginia Police Department. They are in plain clothes, unmarked vehicle, and they claim that Mr. Bailey then drops some items. They don't know what it is. They go over and pick up the items, and those items include two small bags of marijuana, 53 pills of Xanax -- not the drugs that normally were associated with the drug dealing of the Seven Mile Bloods -- and a small amount of cocaine.

So then they meet up with Mr. Bailey having seen him alleging throw down these drugs, and they ask him what

his name is. He says Dwayne Pruitt. It doesn't matter what he says. He could say whatever he wants. They are going to arrest him. They saw what he did, and so there is no connection really between what he is saying about who he is and police activity.

THE COURT: Wouldn't it intend to show consciousness of quilt?

MR. DALY: In what way? So if he says, I'm Judge Steeh, do you think they're going to do anything different? No. They are going to arrest you like they arrested Mr. Bailey. It doesn't really matter what he says. He can't conceal what he did based on who he is because they're operating not what he is saying about his identity, but what he did, right? So that's the disconnect.

So the government can say consciousness of guilt theoretically, and that has some traction to it, but it's only when you analyze the specific conduct of the parties and the place that you realize that theoretically it doesn't fit. That's why I'm going through all of the facts, because there's nothing that the police do that's different based on his fake name.

So the reason why I'm doing this is that 401, 403, 401 is it relevant? Is it probative, and is it more prejudicial than probative? And so if Mr. Bailey got on

the witness stand and testified about these incidents, then they could introduce this for credibility. They could impeach him because he used a false name and he lied. So that's a different thing than the government in their case in chief using it as character evidence to impugn who he is. Those are accept two separate issues.

So I would say if we put him on the stand, the government is free to ask him about all his aliases, did he use them and why did he do it.

And the last incident is Overt Act 74 from
October 27, 2009. That's a case where the police stopped
a vehicle driven by a woman whose name I recall is
Ms. Parker. I think you heard evidence of that at the
evidentiary hearing. Mr. Bailey was a front passenger of
the vehicle, and when they stopped the vehicle, because
allegedly there was a brake light that was out, and they
ordered everybody out. Mr. Bailey was the front
passenger. They told him to get out. They searched him.
They found no weapons, no guns, no money. Nothing.

So what is the consciousness of guilt related to that because they don't arrest him? He's got no drugs. He's not hiding anything in terms of the offense. What they found a bag -- a duffel bag in the trunk with a small amount of marijuana and some money that Mr. McClure said belonged to him, and Mr. McClure was arrested.

So what I'm trying to do, Judge, is give you the specifics of the case that put it in context because the government often says in their reply, you've got to put it in context.

So when we move from the theoretical of consciousness of guilt to the specifics, there's such a disconnect between the two, that it is our position that you should exclude that in the case in chief. You're frowning at me.

THE COURT: Yeah, I'm not sure I understand the theoretical reference. You got -- why would it be any different than fleeing the police? Obviously, defendants may flee for a number of innocent reasons --

MR. DALY: Yes.

THE COURT: -- but one potential inference on flight by a defendant is that he's fleeing because he knows that he's done something wrong, and he doesn't want to be caught.

MR. DALY: Yes.

THE COURT: Right?

MR. DALY: Right.

THE COURT: Why is this any different from

that?

MR. DALY: Well, there's a difference between flight where we're trying to actively escape arrest or

detection, and what I said. So if the person, according to the police, committed the crime in their presence, it doesn't matter who they are. That's the disconnect. So it doesn't matter what he says about who he is. He's going to be arrested, right?

THE COURT: Well, depending on the discretion the officer employs. We have a number of incidents with these very defendants where they might -- you might have anticipated that they would be arrested, but the officer employed his discretion and decides that maybe somebody else is more culpable than this individual and lets them pass, and maybe that could very well be the result because in another context they don't know who they are dealing with.

MR. DALY: I think as a general concept, I would agree, but when you get down to the specifics of what was happening, I don't think that the officers would ever exercise their discretion not to arrest Mr. Bailey because he said he was somebody else given what they saw. If they see him drop the drugs, they are going to arrest him, right? They are not going to say, oh, you're Eric Brown. We'll let you go home. Oh, you're Dwayne Pruitt. We'll let you go home. You're not Corey Bailey. We'll let you go home. That's what I'm talking about.

The question of flight is separate from the use of

an alias to try to deceive the police in terms of what they are doing. That is at least how I see it in the context.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Daly.

MR. DALY: Do you want me to go onto the next area, or do you want them to respond because we are going through a number of different areas?

THE COURT: Well, why don't I hear the response. I know part of the response is going to be it is premature, that I should be making these judgments as the evidence comes in, and if I end up agreeing with it, maybe that will relieve you of the need to go through all of the others.

MR. DALY: Okay. Thank you.

MR. SLOAN: Good morning, your Honor.

William Sloan on behalf of the United States.

THE COURT: Welcome, Mr. Sloan.

MR. SLOAN: Thank you, your Honor.

Your Honor, as you just mentioned the first argument the government would make is that this is premature; that most of evidentiary arguments raised by the defendant, including this one, would be better resolved during trial in the proper factual context, but I would like to avoid -- excuse me -- address a couple of the issues raised by Mr. Daly.

Just starting with the framework, the cases here, I certainly agree with Mr. Daly on the cases he cited, and there's a Sixth Circuit case that says we disfavor the use of aliases in indictments or at trial. However, I think it is important to look at the context of those cases, and what the Court's concern is.

I think these are best interpreted as the Court just putting a thumb on the scale of 403, and cases that the defendant cites involves these facts.

Number one in Wilkerson, that involved the prosecutor inflaming the jury, as the court put it, by referring to the defendant using an alias and saying people with nothing to hide don't use aliases. That's not the case here. It's not what the government will use this evidence for. This evidence will come in simply as part of the narrative explanation of testifying regarding the police officers.

Number two --

THE COURT: Wait. Wait. Wait. So we're discussing the probative value of this evidence, and you're argument is that it is just part of the narrative?

MR. SLOAN: Well, your Honor, I'll turn to that in one second. I was just trying to set the framework. I think the Court's concern of these cases is sort of the inherently prejudicial nature of a potential

nickname, or if the government uses it in a certain way. Neither is the case here.

So the other example that I was going to make, your Honor, is in the Williams case. That defendant's nickname was Capone. Obviously, that has some inherent prejudicial value.

If this were a case hypothetically where the defendant's nickname was murder, quote-unquote, but it was a drug case, we could certainly understand why there might be an issue there. That is just not the factual circumstance we're dealing with here. These were anodyne fake names, just like Joe Smith, the defendant gave obviously to avoid getting caught.

There were three instances which Mr. Daly referred to, and as the government set forth in its brief, these uses of fake names are relevant for a couple of reasons.

Number one, I think it does help certain officers identify the defendant for a given action. It's part of the narrative explanation of how this encounter unfolded -- how they first encountered Mr. Bailey, and ultimately identified him by his true name. But as the Court referred to a minute ago, I think the really important point here is it is evidence of consciousness of guilt, not only of the pattern of drug dealing conduct in West Virginia, which is alleged as racketeering activity

in the indictment, but also the government would note of the October 21, 2009 murder of Ronald Calloway.

The first -- I think it is notable, your Honor, that the first time Mr. Bailey used the alias Dwayne Pruitt was October 27th, just six days after that homicide. So perhaps he left the Detroit area, was down in West Virginia, and when encountered by the police it doesn't matter whether or not they found anything on him or were going to arrest him. It's what was in Mr. Bailey's mind, which is, I want to avoid getting caught. He doesn't know what the police are going to do. The police might just run the name he gives, and not ultimately fingerprint him and take him back to the police station to confirm that identity.

So I think it is consciousness the guilt because Mr. Bailey just doesn't know what actions the police are going to take as the your Honor just pointed out.

Your Honor, I would also point out that he used that fake name twice in a row or about two weeks later, which again, is evidence of the pattern of his travel to West Virginia for drug activity, and using the same pattern of trying to avoid getting caught giving the same name to police.

Your Honor, for those reasons, the government would suggest, first of all, that it's premature to

exclude this categorically in advance of trial, but on the merits it is relevant to show consciousness of guilt on behalf of Mr. Bailey.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. DALY: So Judge, I'll just respond, and then I'll move on to the next argument.

As you heard in the evidentiary hearing, when Detective Allen and the other officer -- whose names escape me -- when they talk about these incidents when Mr. Bailey used an alias, they refeed to him as Bailey. They never referred to him as Brown or Pruitt, because they knew who he was. The only time the alias came up was when the government directly asked the question, did he use a different name. Other than that, they started from Point A to the end, always referred to him as Corey Bailey. So it's -- there's no confusion here among the police about who he was, and what they are going to say at trial.

So when talking about consciousness of guilt, it has to be consciousness of guilt of the crime charged is what the law says, and so the government says well, if it's not consciousness of guilt of the actual offense for which he was arrested, it has something to do with a homicide back in 2009, but what they didn't tell you is that the warrant for the homicide in 2009 wasn't signed by

the prosecutor until October 26th. So we're talking about him using an alias on October 27th in West Virginia, and the chances of him knowing that a warrant signed by the prosecutor had been put on the docket sheet, and not necessarily put in the lien machine the day before is almost zero. So to say that he was trying to avoid apprehension for the homicide does not fit either factually.

So that's what I would say in response to the government, and may I move to the next issue, Judge?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. DALY: Thank you.

So this has to do with the conspiracy hearsay objections, and again, the government says that this is premature, and if you agree, I will sit down and not say another word. I will object during the trial, but my understanding is that when we filed this original motion to have you order the government to disclose to us at least 24 hours in advance what they intended to do, it was your intent to have these issues litigated not in front of jury, but before, and that's why I don't think it is premature because that's the same argument that they made as they just did.

They don't want you to rule on this, but they haven't said to you that these witnesses will say

something different than what they said in the first trial; in other words, they don't have, and they don't make an offer of proof that there's some additional reason why this evidence should be admissible. And so I say as a matter of expediency, you should decide this now unless the government has something else that they have not put in their brief that they want to bring to your attention.

And so what we are talking about are two witnesses that testified during the first trial, and the first witness is a person Derrick Kennedy.

So Derrick Kennedy testified that contrary to the government's brief where they said that he was an SMB member, he testified explicitly before you during his guilty plea he was not a member, which you considered previously in ruling on these issues was important.

So we have Derrick Kennedy saying he's not a SMB member, and we also have the fact that the other person who is involved in this conversation, allegedly Michael Rogers, was acquitted.

So does the acquittal mean that you're completely bound by that? No, because it is proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and now you're at a preponderance of the evidence. So those are two different standards, but to ignore that powerful evidence that he was acquitted, I think would be a mistake.

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So the beginning of analysis is are these people who are SMB members or not, and that's the beginning of the conversation I think for you.

So according to Mr. Kennedy -- and this involves the shooting of Djuan Page in July of 2014, July 14th -this is what the conversation allegedly is about. After the July 14th shooting, 2014, near the Lawton parole address, according to Mr. Kennedy, he has a conversation with Arnold, and in that conversation with Arnold, Arnold says, I did the shooting. I did it alone. Nobody else was with me. I used my own qun, and it was a 10-millimeter. That's what he tells Kennedy, and I believe -- although may be mistaken -- that ultimately the government retrieves a slug from one of twins Michael who was in the car too, and that slug is consistent with a .40 caliber 10-millimeter weapon. So that's all Kennedy knows. And Derrick Kennedy and Arnold are like this. They are very close. Derrick Kennedy talked about being at the mall, the confrontation with the twins and the Hustle Boys, how he stuck with him. They are really tight.

Now we go all the way to December, five or six months later, and Derrick Kennedy claims that he has a conversation with Michael Rogers. So that's why I brought up Michael Rogers who was acquitted, and he claims that in

this later conversation with Michael Rogers, the subject of why the police and the FBI were looking at Corey Bailey about the July shooting, and Kennedy says, I don't understand it. Arnold told me he was the only one involved. Why were they looking at Sonny, and allegedly Michael Rogers says something to the effect, the dumb ass was leaning out the window and waving a flag, and that's what we're trying to keep out because it is not a statement in furtherance of the conspiracy.

And the two cases, one of which you often refer to in the prior trial, Worman, and the other case Mitchell, is what Michael Rogers is doing, assuming that it's true for the purposes of this argument, he is merely informing Mr. Kennedy about a past event. He's not furthering the conspiracy in any way, shape or form. This is a conversation just between two people who I say are not members of the Seven Mile Bloods, and they are trying to clarify what had happened, and there's really nothing in that conversation that could promote the objectives of the conspiracy.

So the government faced with that, again theorizes that the importance of that conversation was that Mr. Kennedy was now on notice that the people involved in the shooting was not just Mr. Arnold, but Mr. Bailey, and they theorize that the significance of this in terms of

the objective of the conspiracy was that Mr. Kennedy was now on notice that Mr. Bailey was also involved, and therefore, Kennedy needs to stay away from Bailey because of the retaliation and the conflict between the two parties that he could be the subject of a shooting. That's their theory about how it further the conspiracy.

But the problem with that is that it is not case specific. Why? Because Kennedy was already on the hit list for the Hustle Boys. He was already a target. It didn't matter who he associated with, whether it was Arnold, Bailey or Scooby-Doo. It doesn't matter. He's already on the hit list, number one.

Number two, because of his close relationship with Bailey, and the Hustle Boys knew that because they confronted Arnold and Kennedy together on multiple occasions, he was already a target by his relationship with Bailey, and because the brothers, the twins, had allegedly said that Arnold was involved in the shooting.

So this whole theory about, oh my God. Now he's going to be a victim of a shooting in retaliation, is not an accurate representation of the specific facts. So it is a fishing theory unsupported by the evidence, Judge, and we would ask that you exclude that.

I don't think there's anything else that Mr. Kennedy has ever said in a proffer or trial other than

what I said, the government knows about it. Let them say it, but I haven't seen it. So we're trying to keep that out.

The other thing has to do with Ms. Scott, and as you recall, Ms. Scott testified about an incident sometime in July of 2014. Again, this is according to government's theory somewhat related to shooting on the 14th.

According to Ms. Scott, she was in a vehicle with Mr. McClure, and they are driving over to the Erotic City, a bar, and at this bar allegedly our Hustle Boys, including the twins, and on the way over, according to Ms. Scott, Mr. McClure, who is dead, says we are going to start something. A rather vague statement. There's no weapons in the car. It's not clear from her testimony that, in fact, Mr. Bailey is present in the car. They pick him up.

So what we have is, we have Ms. Scott in her first debriefing on September 20, 2016, never mentioning this, I'm going to start something. That's the first debriefing.

The second debriefing is December 9, 2016.

Again, she says nothing about McClure saying something is going to get started, and then there's her trial testimony from the last trial which she makes this statement.

So in response to trying to keep this out

because it's not in furtherance of the conspiracy, the government's response is that it's a verbal act, and it's not offered for the truth, which is, again, has some sex appeal to it, but the problem is if you admit it for that reason, we're going ask that you turn and tell the jury with an instruction that that statement is not being offer for the truth, right? Tell them right now that the government is saying something, but they're not claiming it's true. It's just going to show what was said, and let the jury try to figure that out and understand it.

So when they start by saying that it's not being offered for the truth, then they switch gears later on and they say look what happened. He said something was going to happen and something did happen. So in essence, they really want the jury to accept it for the truth of the matter asserted, that is, that something was going to start.

So then according to Ms. Scott, the two individuals, meaning Mr. Bailey and Mr. McClure, they go into the Erotic Club. They are gone for 10 minutes. Come back. Mr. McClure is bleeding from the head, pounds on the window, and allegedly says Neff hit me with a bottle, and we're seeking to exclude that too. The government says it's an excited utterance. It isn't at this point. They may be able to, they may not be able to lay a

foundation, but at this point the record doesn't support that.

But really in the end, there are some other things that you need to consider in context of this motion about what was happening at the time, and whether or not they were going to go there to start something. She testified there was a flier about this party, and the people that were invited were Mr. McClure and Mr. Bailey.

So in the context of this information that the government wants to seek in introduce in their case in chief, Judge, we would say they don't have the proper foundation. It's not in furtherance of the conspiracy, and we would ask that you exclude it. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Mr. Sloan?

MR. SLOAN: Thank you, your Honor.

Your Honor, picking up on Mr. Daly's last point, I think it's a perfect example of why ruling now pretrial is simply not possible. What the defense does in their motion is assume that the trial transcript from a previous trial with different defendants is somehow set in stone, and the witnesses are going to say the exact same thing and create the exact same foundation.

As your Honor knows, that's just not the case. What matters is the evidence will come in fresh in a new

trial with these defendants, and the witnesses will testify to what they will testify to. They may testify in a slightly different way, or articulate different details, and that's for obvious reasons.

Number one, there are different defendants on trial. So they may be asked different questions more key to those defendants. That may produce different information. Different attorneys will ask the questions in a different way, and witnesses, you know, may say things a little bit differently if asked a question differently or they remember it better this time.

So I think as a starting point we can't just assume this prior trial transcript, which defense counsel has used to make the factual basis for his motion, is controlling, and that's why the government starts with the initial point, which is that essentially the Court has already ruled how it wants to handle proffers about out of court statements, and that was Court's order, docket entry 828, which is a day prior notice by the government of anticipated out of court statements, and then the Court will conditionally admit those subject to the government proving the three elements required for a co-conspirator's statement in furtherance by a preponderance of evidence.

So just as a starting matter, the government recommends that the Court stick to that plan precisely

because the evidence will be coming in in a new way.

Just as one example of that, your Honor, it's hard to make these determinations whether it's 801(d)(2)(E) or some other hearsay exception or exclusion in advance of trial, because the evidence might be developed slightly differently.

For example, Mr. McClure statements to Ms. Scott and or Mr. Bailey regarding the July 2014 trip to a rival Hustle Boy gang party where Mr. McClure said he was going to start something, comes back to the car a few minutes later bleeding with Mr. Bailey, and says Neff hit him in the head with a liquor bottle.

Now one of the -- that statement that Neff hit him in the head with a liquor bottle was repeated several times by Mr. McClure as Ms. Scott testified to her when he and Bailey came back from the club initially, again to Billy Arnold sometime shortly thereafter, and then later to other SMB members, Jig and Nice, at a house, and one thing that was not developed in Ms. Scott's testimony was what, if any, initial reaction did Billy Arnold have when Mr. McClure said that rival gang member just hit me in the head with a liquor bottle. We just don't know the answer to that question.

So to categorically exclude something before trial makes no sense in the circumstances because we don't know

what the exact foundation will be.

Now turning to 801(d)(2)(E) specifically your Honor, which is really the heart of the defendant's motion here, and I would say as a side, your Honor, I apologize for the lengthy brief, but the government did that just as a preview of ways that this could come in, and the reason the government set out alternative explanations is for the reason that I just articulated. We just don't know what the witness might say at the time, but I will say to the Court that most, if not all of these, the government believes will be admissible for their truth under 801(d)(2)(E).

And before I turn to the specific statements in a little more detail, I just want to point out some parameters of the law that I think were a little bit muddied in Mr. Daly's motion. The three elements that the government has to show by a preponderance and the finding that the Court has to make is number one, a conspiracy existed, number two, that the defendant against the statement was offered, in this case Mr. Bailey, was a member of that conspiracy, and number three, that the co-conspirator declarant made the statement during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.

I think the motion really focuses on prong three, but I just want to clarify number one, as to the speaker

or declarant, just to reiterate, Mr. Daly conceded I think. The fact that Michael Rogers was acquitted does not bar him from being a co-conspirator for purposes of 801(d)(2)(E) analysis. The jury acquittal simply means the jury didn't find that he was guilty of RICO conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt, which, of course, is a higher standard than mere preponderance. And we would point to a Sixth Circuit case that specifically states this, and that's United States versus Todd, T-o-d-d, 920 F.2d 399.

And then point number two, the listener need not be a co-conspirator. The language that Mr. Daly used in his brief was these statements should not come in because they are not, quote-unquote, among co-conspirators, but that's not what the rule requires. The rule requires that the defendant against whom it's offer be a co-conspirator and the declarant be a co-conspirator, and we have that here. Mr. Bailey -- the government anticipates the trial evidence will show that Mr. Bailey, Mr. McClure and Mr. Rogers were all part of a racketeering conspiracy.

Mr. Daly claimed that Mr. Kennedy testified that he was not SMB. Your Honor, I beg to differ with that characterization. In fact, in the first trial he testified he that he was 5-5, which is in some sense synonymous with or a certain subgroup of SMB. He even testified that he had a 5-5 tattoo on his body, as does

Mr. Rogers. So the government anticipates that trial evidence will show that Mr. Kennedy was, in fact, a co-conspirator and Mr. Rogers was a co-conspirator.

Now turning to first set of statements by Michael Rogers to Derrick Kennedy regarding the July 14th shooting of Djuan Page, Neff, and the substance of that statement as Mr. Daly stated was that Mr. Kennedy didn't know until Mr. Rogers told him that Mr. Bailey was in the car with Billy Arnold during the shooting. And the defense argument essentially is that this couldn't be in furtherance because it is months --

THE COURT: After the fact.

MR. SLOAN: -- after the fact --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. SLOAN: -- and therefore, how could this possibly further a conspiracy, and the government's response, your Honor, is that the case law I think -- well, start with the case law.

Statements that serve to identify co-conspirators and their roles in the conspiracy are in furtherance, as well as statements that update or apprise a co-conspirator of the status of the conspiracy, and in this case the conspiracy, part of what's alleged, is of this racketeering enterprise. This gang was an ongoing gang war with rivals, and part of the pattern of their

racketeering activity was to protect their image and reputation through violence and force through controlling territory in the Red Zone.

And so in the midst of an ongoing shooting gang war, the government submits that being informed one of your co-conspirators was involved in a particular shooting is precisely an update on the status of the conspiracy.

The second point, your Honor, is, you know, I think context matters here. It's true the statement was made a few months after the shooting, but as the government pointed out in its brief, in the intervening time -- and in fact right before the statement was made around Christmas time of 2014 -- two other SMB members had recently been shot.

So it just goes to show that this was an ongoing shooting war, and in fact, the government would submit that the July shooting of Neff kicked off the shooting war. And so to be informed of an update of the conspiracy in December was just as relevant then as it would be in July of 2014.

Why? So that a co-conspirator would take actions to go stay alive and or take vengeance on rival gang members. It's certainly relevant to know that one of your fellow gang members did something you thought other one did, so that if you're walking down the street with

Mr. Bailey, you might be more likely to be shot than with another member.

And your Honor, I think what's lost in Mr. Daly's motion is the three elements of 801(d)(2)(E) are by preponderance. That's more likely than not. The government does not have to prove 100 percent or beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement did further, or it was only intended to communicate this to this co-conspirator. In fact, the case law is pretty clear that statements that can be interpreted with different meanings or that were made not even primarily to further the conspiracy can be in furtherance. The preponderance standard is not an incredibly a high bar for this third prong.

And the last point on the Michael Rogers statements, your Honor, in terms of timing it, I think a good case in point factually would be the Odum case, O-d-u-m, 878 F.3d 508, which we did cite in our brief, and, you know, admittedly, the time span is a bit short in this case. The statements were made shortly after the shooting, but I think the purpose comes across here.

In that case this was a motorcycle gang vicar trial I believe before Judge Borman initially, and on appeal the defendants contested admission of certain statements that the shooters came back to the motorcycle clubhouse shortly after the shooting, and updated the club

leadership on the shooting they just done. And what the Sixth Circuit said was, you know, even though it happened after the fact, it's a statement of a past event, this was in furtherance because the statements were updating the leadership to that they could take steps to avert retaliation from the rival gang who was a victim of the shooting.

It's a very similar purpose here. Mr. Rogers is updating Mr. Kennedy on what a co-conspirator has done so he can take steps to anticipate a response from the rival gang.

And turning briefly to the next set of statements which were made by Mr. McClure to -- some combination of Ms. Scott and Mr. Bailey and then Mr. Arnold, Jig and Nice subsequently. As the government laid we think those are admissible for a number of reasons, but to include 801(d)(2)(E).

And as to Ms. Scott, I would like to emphasize something that we didn't necessarily emphasize in the brief, which is, that we think these are 801(d)(2)(E) as to her as well, both the statement that Mr. McClure is going to start something in the club, as well as the subsequent statement that Neff hit him in the head with the bottle, and the reason is this, your Honor, the law does not require that the -- number one, that the

listener, Ms. Scott, be a co-conspirator at all. It only requires that the listener be prompted to take some action to facilitate the conspiracy, and that's exactly what happened here.

Ms. Scott drives -- her boyfriend Mr. McClure tells Ms. Scott, I'm going to start something at a rival gang party. What is her response? She drives him and Mr. Bailey to that party, waits for him. When he comes back, Mr. McClure informs her that he was hit in the head by a rival gang member. What does she do? She drives Mr. McClure, Mr. Bailey to talk to Billy Arnold, and then drives Mr. McClure to talk to Jig and Nice so they can communicate what this rival gang did to disrespect and assault Mr. McClure.

So in that sense, Ms. Scott is acting upon statements by Mr. McClure to take actions to facilitate further action by the gang. So we submit that Ms. Scott, the statements to her, also fall within the co-conspirator exception here.

And your Honor, I don't want to belabor the other arguments that we made in the notice brief unless the Court has any question.

THE COURT: I'm good. Thanks.

So the -- with respect to the evidence that has just been reviewed, I have not really heard anything that

would lead the Court to conclude that the protocol we employed during the first trial is not appropriate, and that the evidence should be excluded without considering the state of the evidence to the date of the statement in dispute as a co-conspirator statement pursuant to 801 (d)(2)(E), and the analysis that is dictated.

I think the parties agree on the analysis that needs to be employed. The process of notifying opposing counsel of their intention to introduce evidence pursuant to 801(d)(2)(E) by the day before the continuation of trial I think is appropriate as the protocol was established originally, and it worked well. It think it gave the both sides the opportunity to consider whether the statement is idle chitchat about past events, or an update on the status of the ongoing conflict between rival gangs and the risks that individual defendants are members or participants in an enterprise committed.

So the Court is going to I think refrain from making a declaration at this juncture with respect to the admissibility of the evidence because it can, indeed, be affected by the other evidence in the case up to the time of the claims statement.

So the Court will deny the motion in limine, so that the analysis can be undertaken, if there is a conflict between the parties with respect to admissibility

of the same evidence at the time it's intended to be introduced by the government.

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It also pairs up with Rule of Evidence 104(b), which permits the Court to proceed to make conditional admissions based on what request other evidence is anticipated, and I think there was a fair amount of testimony at the first trial that was introduced and was conditionally admitted, and I think by the end of the evidence phase there were no conflicts over the admissibility of those statements that were conditionally admitted under 104(b).

So I think the process worked successfully and efficiently in the first trial, and should again in this trial.

Why don't we take a five minute break.

(Recess taken.)

(Proceedings resumed.)

THE COURT: All right. So again, we're going to employ the protocol that was employed in the first trial.

And next on my list is just a scheduling question.

One, we're going to begin with the preliminary

instructions from the Court which will be relatively brief except for a summary of the elements of the various claims that are agreed upon here. They have a proposal that was I think generated initially by the government, and then tweaked by the defense. So is there any remaining conflicts to be resolved as it relates to the elements of the charges?

MR. WECHSLER: Justin Wechsler for the government.

The only issue we had after Mr. Spielfogel sent it to the government was -- I apologize. I don't have it in front of me -- the line about it's not illegal to be a member of the Seven Mile Bloods, or it's not a crime to be a member of the Seven Mile Bloods. We're okay with that statement generally, but we prefer say it's not illegal to be a member of an enterprise, because those definitions that appear right before that talk about what an enterprise is over and over again, and all of a sudden we're saying the proposal it's not illegal to be a member of the Seven Mile Bloods. As long as we make it it's not illegal to be a member of the seven Mile Bloods. As long as we make it it's not illegal to be a member of an enterprise, we're okay with the suggestions that Mr. Spielfogel put forward.

THE COURT: Okay. That was put forward by Mr. Spielfogel and who?

MR. WECHSLER: I believe it came from Mr.

1 Spielfogel. 2 MR. MAGIDSON: I also supplemented something. 3 **THE COURT:** Okay. What was your supplement? I know I just entertained a request --4 THE CLERK: I have it. 5 6 MR. MAGIDSON: I'm glad somebody has it. 7 THE COURT: As proposed by the defense, as it 8 relates to what Mr. Wechsler just addressed, the proposed 9 language is it is not illegal in and of itself to be a 10 member or associate of the Seven Mile Bloods, and that was 11 proffered by who, defendants collectively? 12 MR. DALY: I think by Mr. Spielfogel. 13 was no objection from the other lawyers. So I would say 14 by silence, that they agree. 15 MR. MAGIDSON: If I may, I was just handed by one of my colleagues here something that I did tender. 16 17 thought I was tendering it to the Court, but apparently it 18 never made it. 19 THE COURT: Okay. 20 MR. MAGIDSON: When I do things on my own, 21 that's what happens. I cited a case, United States versus 22 Turkette, a Supreme Court case, 452 U.S. 576. In there

15-20652; USA v. EUGENE FISHER, ET AL

they had language as follows: While the proof used to

establish the separate elements may in a particular case

coalesce, proof of one does not necessarily establish the

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other. The, quote, enterprise, end of the quote, is not the pattern of racketeering activity. It is an entity separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which it engages. The existence of an enterprise is a separate element which must be proved by the government.

That was part -- because the government had included in addition to the actual elements, there's some commentary that was included, and I thought as long as we're going to be doing that, then we should balance this as well. And so I thought this would be important just to tell the jury that there's different -- that there's a distinction that has to be made all times, and that an enterprise is not to same as a pattern of racketeering activity, and that it has to be proven separately. This is an general instruction.

THE COURT: So following the five elements of the RICO conspiracy charge in Count 1, we have a paragraph, and the paragraph describes what an enterprise is.

MR. MAGIDSON: Right. If I may, Judge, I can tender this to the Court for your edification.

MR. WECHSLER: Can we see a copy? This is first chance that we heard about this.

I think when the Court lays out the five elements, you know, first this, second this, it's going to be clear

to them, the jurors, that there are five distinct elements, and I don't necessarily have a huge problem with the Court saying these are distinct, and each have to be proved, but it seems that this statement that Mr. Magidson just gave to us, it's going too far into almost a final jury instruction, and in some ways an argument from the defense attorneys of what does and does not need to be proven. I just think the jurors, this early on, will benefit from more of a succinct instruction than --

THE COURT: That ship has sailed I think.

MR. WECHSLER: Well, in fairness yes, you know, one of the alternatives would just be the elements solely. We tried to limit the definitions we wanted to use because we think that everyone on that panel for both the prosecution and the defense will wonder what an enterprise is, and I think it's enough to say it's not illegal in and of itself to be a member of an enterprise. I think with those five elements, the jury will be able to put together what it is they need to be thinking about as the trial progresses. It think this in some way has become almost too legalistic.

THE COURT: Yeah, I was not processing it very well during --

MR. WECHSLER: I'll hand it to the Court.

THE COURT: All right. I'll consider the

addition sought here and incorporate it if I feel incorporating any of it in the proposed discussion of the elements is called for.

So at the last trial we didn't have any time limits, and I think that defense counsel must have had --must have conferred to parse out the discussion from defense counsel to defense counsel, so that we had the government consuming 40 minutes, we had Mr. Rataj consuming 20, Mr. Mullkoff consuming 25, Mr. Arnone 10 and Mr. Machasic five, and so it was quite manageable. I don't know if you have an idea of how long your opening statements are likely to require. The government first, Mr. Wechsler?

MR. WECHSLER: I will be doing the opening.

Sometimes I speak fast. Sometimes I speak slowly, as I'm sure you're aware. I think realistically 45 minutes will be the max. It may go a little over that. I haven't timed myself, but I don't foresee myself going much longer than that at all.

THE COURT: Okay. Among defense counsel, Mr. Magidson?

MR. MAGIDSON: John Theis will be doing the opening. I've talked with him. He's not long winded. He will be talking about the salient points, and I would be surprised if he goes over 20 minutes.

THE COURT: 1 Okay. 2 MR. DALY: Judge, on behalf of Mr. Bailey, 3 Mr. Spielfogel will be making the opening statement. have not talked to him about his specific time frame. He 4 has not indicated what that might be. I guess that's as 5 6 much information as I can give you at this point. 7 THE COURT: All right. Yes, Mr. Feinberg? 8 MR. FEINBERG: I suspect no more than 30 9 minutes, but I have a problem that I would like to address 10 the Court as to my giving an opening statement as it 11 relates to information that I was given late yesterday by 12 Eric Straus that may cause a problem with my proceeding 13 Monday with opening statement. 14 THE COURT: I see. Of course you can always 15 reserve. MR. FEINBERG: Well, I don't want to do that. 16 17 Do you want me to present to the Court the issue that I'm 18 now confronted with? 19 THE COURT: Well, yes and no. Let me hear 20 from Mr. Scharg and Mr. Scharg. 21 MR. S. SCHARG: Good morning, your Honor. 22 Steven Scharg on behalf of Mr. Porter. 23 Your Honor, I think we will be no longer than 20 24 minutes. 25 THE COURT: All right.

MR. H. SCHARG: In Wayne County Circuit 1 2 Court, they refer to us as the evil Scharg and good 3 Scharg, and I'm embarrassed to tell you which one I am. In regards to the opening statement, for the first 4 time 40 years, I intend to reserve. 5 6 THE COURT: I see. Okay. All right. 7 MR. H. SCHARG: We don't have -- Mr. Johnson 8 is not here. So --THE COURT: Right. I just want to make sure 9 10 it was likely that we will finish openings on the first 11 day of trial, and it certainly appears likely that we 12 will. I'm not imposing time limits. 13 MR. WECHSLER: With that said, your Honor, is 14 it fair to say the government should be ready to bring witnesses in for Tuesday morning, and use the first day 15 more for whatever business the Court has with the jurors 16 17 as well as openings? 18 THE COURT: Well, I think we found that if 19 you have one or two witnesses standing by, if concludes -if the opening statements conclude by noon, I would hate 20 21 to lose that last hour. 22 MR. WECHSLER: Fair enough. 23 MR. H. SCHARG: I can give an opening 24 statement if you want me to fill the time up. 25 THE COURT: No, no. Definitely not. Okay.

I'll come back to Mr. Feinberg in just a moment.

The Court would like to encourage counsel to consider stipulations with respect to much of the medical evidence that we spent a lot of time admitting through, you know, the doctors who were in the ER, and really contributing nothing more than the notes that were introduced as records of treatment, and really I thought that it would be much more efficient to seek to stipulate at least to the introduction of the medical records, and forego the testimony of the treaters, but --

MR. WECHSLER: The government will speak with defense attorneys. We're prepare to stipulate to the doctors that come in for some of the nonfatal shootings, but for the medical examiners, we would like bring in those witnesses.

THE COURT: Okay. That makes sense.

MR. WECHSLER: Obviously, we will have a conversation with defense attorneys about this as well.

THE COURT: Right. Right. And so we've got conference rooms that are going to be down on the first floor that are going to be reserved. One will be reserved for defense counsel, which is near Judge Berg's chambers, and then the government witnesses will be, as they report, directed to a room that is next to Judge Tarnow's chambers so you can keep track of them and will be immediately

available.

conducted.

So that's all I have on my list.

Mr. Feinberg, you wanted to address that issue?

MR. FEINBERG: Yes, your Honor. Late

yesterday, early evening, I got a phone call from AUSA

Eric Straus telling me that there is new witness that they

have just found that is allegedly going to testify that

Mr. Brown committed the murder. I have no report. I have

no -- I believe that there was a photo display. I mean,

this is 12 years ago that the murder took place. I

suspect that I'm going to need to file a motion to have a

evidentiary hearing as to the photo spread, how it was

Again, I don't have any of the information. Even if I got it today, I doubt whether or not I would be able to follow it before tomorrow or Monday. I can't give an opening statement if I don't know what the evidence is going to be involving the shooting. I know what is -- what I have, but this is brand new.

So I'm letting the Court know that there's a possibility that I will not be prepared to even give an opening statement or proceed Monday morning without being able to get the information and file whatever motions are necessary, and the Court conduct an evidentiary hearing.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Wechsler?

MR. WECHSLER: Your Honor, yesterday agents did speak with a witness who -- well, he's listed in the police report from the 2006 homicide, but did not give a very detailed statement to the police at that time. The agents went back and talked to him yesterday, which Mr. Feinberg is correct. He picked out Mr. Brown in a photo array.

We informed the agents that they needed to have the report done as soon as possible to get it to Mr. Feinberg. As he's indicated, Mr. Straus from our office give him this information yesterday. We are planning to have the 302 done today. We will reiterate to the agents again that they need to get it done as soon as possible for Mr. Feinberg to review.

Additionally, we don't plan on presenting evidence of this homicide until I believe at least week two, which gives him an extra week to file any motions that he would like, and any litigation that needs to take place can happen after the 1:00 break.

THE COURT: Would your opening statement be addressing any of this?

MR. WECHSLER: The only thing that I plan to say is that we have witnesses who will testify about that homicide. I don't plan on saying anything about this particular witness. I'll leave it very vague. We do have

another witness in which he was -- Mr. Feinberg was given notice awhile ago that he would testify about this, and so I believe when I say that we have witnesses that will testify about this, that will cover that witness. I don't need to specifically say that we have John Smith who said that he saw Mr. Brown on the day in question. I don't need to list those individuals which would give Mr. Feinberg a chance to rebut that in his motions.

THE COURT: Right. All right.

MR. FEINBERG: May I respond?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. FEINBERG: The 302 is not sufficient for me to know what is -- what I need to do. I need to get all of the information that led up to the 302 that was, I guess, prepared yesterday.

In addition, if there was any -- if there was a photo lineup, I need to get that, who conducted it, how it was done, whether or not there was a defense attorney present during the photo lineup, how it was done, whether or not it was just a regular photo array or whether or not it was a blind photo array.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. FEINBERG: I cannot be prepared for the trial unless I know that, and just to get a statement is insufficient because I know that I'll have to file a

motion that will --

THE COURT: We can conduct the hearing on a motion easily in the afternoon. So I mean, I think the only question is in what manner would your opportunity to make an opening statement, which is just -- we know from the government's side they are not going to make any specific references to the evidence that it is going to be introduced relative to this 2006 killing.

MR. FEINBERG: I understand. If they're going to indicate witnesses, plural, I need to know in my opening statement what we intend to show as it relates to the homicide, the witnesses, specific witnesses. If I don't have that information, I don't know whether or not this Court is going to allow that witness to testify. I don't know whether or not it's going to exclude them from presenting it. If they allow it -- if there's going to be a cautionary instruction as a result of it, I don't know, but I can tell you right now that I'm not prepared Monday to proceed without knowing evidence that is very, very crucial to the most serious of all counts that Mr. Brown is being charged with.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I'll certainly be in a position to consider it when you file your motion after you had an opportunity to review the papers that apparently are in preparation.

MR. FEINBERG: But again, it's more than just 1 2 That maybe what the government thinks all is 3 necessary, but it's certainly not what I think is necessary to file the motion, and if I don't get 4 everything, then there will be a motion to compel, which 5 will prolong the necessity of me filing the motion 6 7 relating to how it was conducted. 8 I'm putting the Court on notice that I may come in 9 on Monday and indicate to the Court that I'm not ready to 10 proceed. 11 THE COURT: Well, okay. I think you should 12 be prepared for the possibility that the Court will agree 13 there are other cures, and will call on you to make 14 decision as to whether --15 MR. FEINBERG: I understand, but I do have a client that I'm representing to a certain extent takes 16 17 precedence over whether or not the Court tells me that I 18 have to proceed. 19 THE COURT: Okay. MR. FEINBERG: I think Mr. Brown wants to 2.0 21 raise his hand. 22 THE COURT: Mr. Feinberg can talk to you for 23 a moment. 24 **DEFENDANT BROWN:** I want to speak to you. 25 THE COURT: Well --

1	MR. FEINBERG: That's what he wants to do,
2	your Honor.
3	DEFENDANT BROWN: I want to go on with the
4	trial. I'm ready Monday.
5	THE COURT: I know that's your feeling.
6	DEFENDANT BROWN: I'm ready Monday, your
7	Honor. I'm ready.
8	THE COURT: Okay.
9	DEFENDANT BROWN: I will be my own defense
10	attorney. Like you told me before, if I fire him, then I
11	have to represent myself, and I'm willing to do that if
12	he's not ready because I'm ready. If he not ready, I'm
13	ready.
14	THE COURT: Okay.
15	DEFENDANT BROWN: Trial goes Monday. I'm
16	here.
17	THE COURT: That's the plan.
18	<b>DEFENDANT BROWN:</b> I'm ready.
19	THE COURT: So Mr. Feinberg will be thinking
20	about how he handles which is not an easy question, and
21	it's concern that you get a fair trial, not just a trial.
22	DEFENDANT BROWN: I'm not trying to get push
23	back, your Honor.
24	THE COURT: Okay.
25	MR. H. SCHARG: Judge, one more thing.

1 THE COURT: Yes. 2 MR. H. SCHARG: Earlier on the severance 3 motion, I asked for an instruction regarding separate defendants, same trial. 4 5 THE COURT: Yes. 6 MR. H. SCHARG: Will you give that in the 7 preliminary instructions? 8 THE COURT: Yes. 9 MR. H. SCHARG: You didn't confirm or deny 10 that. 11 THE COURT: If I didn't, I intend to. I will 12 incorporate that. 13 MR. H. SCHARG: Thank you. 14 **THE COURT:** Okay what else, if anything? 15 MR. DALY: There were two matters left on motions in limine that I won't -- will not argue one of 16 them. I think it as been resolved. I was seeking to 17 18 suppress prior convictions. The judgment, it appears the 19 government has agreed will not introduce in their case in 2.0 chief, unless they feel it is necessary, at which point 21 they will bring it to the Court's attention, and we can 22 deal with it then. That's essentially what we agreed to. 23 MS. FINOCCHIARO: That's correct, your Honor. 24 **THE COURT:** Okay. 25 MR. DALY: So the last part has to do with

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401 and 403 arguments, about the overt acts, and there were a number that were listed there. I'm not going to arque each and every one. It was 71, 72, 94, 95, 100 and 103, and I believe the government agreed not to introduce evidence on 103. So that's done. I'm not going to go through all of those. You've read the briefs, Judge. I will rely on my briefs. You can either rule on the record or a written order. Thank you. THE COURT: Thank you. Anything further from the government side? MR. SLOAN: No. THE COURT: 103, you're in agreement? MR. SLOAN: That's right, your Honor. THE COURT: Mr. Daly, do you wish that I to this on the record.

MR. DALY: No, I don't.

THE COURT: All right. And you're asking have a conference with the Court and government counsel, is that right?

MR. DALY: Yes, and Mr. Spielfogel. He's waiting for conference call.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, if nothing else, we'll break for day.

MR. H. SCHARG: Should we stay around?

## CERTIFICATION

I, Ronald A. DiBartolomeo, official court reporter for the United States District Court, Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, appointed pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 753, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript of the proceedings in the above-entitled cause on the date hereinbefore set forth.

I do further certify that the foregoing transcript has been prepared by me or under my direction.

s/Ronald A. DiBartolomeo
Ronald A. DiBartolomeo, CSR
Official Court Reporter

Date